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  There has been a remarkable shift in the attitudes towards globalization. 
Specifically, the discussion among academics and policymakers has shifted from whether 
globalization should be encouraged to how countries can position themselves to benefit 
from globalization. This paper focuses on one aspect of globalization – the liberalization 
of investment policies – and analyzes its impact on employment and investments by 
multinational corporations in Africa. We use data for 33 countries over the period 1984-
2003 and we employ a dynamic panel estimator for our analysis. There are two major 
findings. First, liberalization has a significant and positive effect on investment. Second, 
liberalization does not have a direct impact on multinational employment – the effect is 
indirect: liberalization stimulates multinational investments which in turn increases 
multinational employment.  By increasing investment and employment from 
multinational firms, these liberalization programs contribute to poverty alleviation. 
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 1 Introduction 
“Private international capital flows, particularly foreign direct investment, are 
vital complements for national and international development efforts. Foreign 
direct investment contributes toward financing sustained economic growth over 
the long term. It is especially important for its potential to transfer knowledge and 
technology, create jobs, boost overall productivity, enhance competitiveness and 
entrepreneurship, and ultimately eradicate poverty through economic growth and 
development.” (UN, 2002, page 5) 
   
  The above quotation suggests that an expansion in the operations of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) in host countries can help alleviate poverty in those countries.  A 
large literature explores the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and the 
growth rate of income in both developing and developed countries with inconclusive 
results.  While some studies find no significant growth impact of FDI (e.g. Carkovic and 
Levine: 2005, de Mello: 1999), other studies find a positive relationship between FDI and 
income growth (e.g. Hansen and Rand: 2006, Krueger: 1983). Still other studies find that 
there is heterogeneity in the relationship between FDI and income growth across 
countries (e.g. Chowdhury and Mavrotas: 2006). Nunnenkamp (2004) argues that FDI 
may have limited effects on growth and poverty alleviation in less developed countries. 
While several studies have investigated the relationship between FDI and income growth, 
what has not been well investigated is the effect of FDI on poverty alleviation.  This 
paper explores the effects of FDI on poverty alleviation by estimating the employment 
effects of FDI in African countries. 
  There are several ways by which MNCs can contribute towards poverty reduction 
and economic growth in host countries.
1 For example, investments by MNCs – i.e., FDI 
serves as a source of finance for economic development. The role of FDI as a source of 
finance is particularly important to Africa for three reasons. First, income levels and 
domestic savings in the region are low. Second, foreign aid to the region has been 
declining. For example, net official development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
                                                 
1 See Winters (2002) and Winters et al (2004) for discussions of the mechanisms through which FDI policies affect 
employment and poverty reduction. Also see Nissanke and Thorbecke (2005) for a discussion on the mechanisms 
through which globalization can affect poverty alleviation and income distribution. 
1 declined from $17 billion in 1990 to $10 billion in 2001, a decrease of about 41% (World 
Bank, 2003).
2 Third, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
declaration stipulates that in order for the continent to achieve its Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) of reducing the number of people living on less than a dollar a 
day by half in 2015, the continent needs to fill an annual resource gap of $64 billion 
(about 12% of GDP).
3 Given the low savings rate and the decline in official assistance, 
the continent may have to rely on MNCs to provide the necessary capital needed for 
poverty alleviation. 
  In addition to providing the capital needed for development, MNCs can alleviate 
poverty by creating employment – directly and indirectly – in host countries. Investments 
by MNCs often generate new employment (direct employment is higher in Greenfield 
investments) and create jobs (indirectly) through forward and backward linkages with 
domestic firms. For example, using data for Namibia, Iyanda (1999) finds that about two 
to four jobs are created locally for each worker employed by an MNC. Another important 
aspect of multinational employment is that MNCs tend to pay higher wages than prevail 
locally. For example Harrison (1996) finds that the wage differences between foreign-
owned firms and domestic firms in Cote d'Ivoire range from 10% to about 90%. 
Moreover, multinational presence sometimes generates wage spillovers:  wages tend to 
be higher in industries and provinces that have a greater foreign presence (Lipsey, 1994; 
Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2001). Axarloglou and Pournarakis, (2007) however, finds that the 
employment and wage effects of FDI vary by industry.  Finally, MNC employment 
facilitates the transfer of technology between foreign and domestic firms and it enhances 
the productivity of the labor force in the host country (Harrison, 1996). It is important to 
note that multinational employment is particularly important to Africa because 
unemployment is prevalent and wages are low. For example, the unemployment rates for 
Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa in 2001 were about 27%, 34% and 26% respectively 
(Southern African Development Community Annual Report). In addition, about 46% of 
the workers in South Africa earn less than the living wage (Fields, 2000). Thus for 
countries such as South Africa, the contribution of MNCs to employment is very critical: 
                                                 
2 Note that the volume of foreign aid to Africa is envisaged to double as a result of the G8 agreements in 2005. 
3 NEPAD is a development plan put together by African leaders to eradicate poverty. For more on this issue see Owusu 
(2003). 
2 employment by MNCs accounted for about 23% of total employment in South Africa in 
1999 (UNCTAD, 2002).
4  
  Given the potential impact of multinational investment and employment on poverty 
alleviation and growth in Africa, it is important to understand the effect of globalization 
on the nature and operations of MNCs in the region. Such an analysis will provide some 
insights into the impact of globalization on the poor in the region. This paper focuses on 
one aspect of globalization – the liberalization of FDI policies – and analyzes its impact 
on employment and investments by multinational corporations in the region. 
  There is a vast empirical literature on the effect of the trade and investment policies 
on FDI. The papers have at least two limitations. First most of studies focus on the 
relationship between trade policy and FDI. As pointed out by Taylor (2000), government 
policy on FDI typically involves more than one policy (e.g., restrictions on profit 
expatriation and threat of expropriation) and is generally more complex than trade 
policy.
5 Nunnenkamp (2002) surveys the literature on liberalization and FDI and notes 
that “The problem with essentially all of these studies is that they use trade-related 
variables that are seriously flawed.” Specifically, most of the studies use 
(exports+imports)/GDP as a measure of openness to foreign investment. One problem 
with using trade ratios as a measure of openness is that it is biased towards large 
countries. Furthermore, as pointed out by Rodrik and Rodriguez (2000), using trade ratios 
as a policy variable is problematic because policymakers do not directly control trade 
volumes.  Another limitation of the literature is that most of the studies employ a cross-
sectional analysis and a few employ a fixed-effects technique. This is problematic for two 
reasons. First, cross-sectional analysis precludes one from analyzing the impact of policy 
over time. Second, FDI and multinational employment have lagged endogenous 
regressors as well as unobserved country fixed-effects which are correlated with the 
regressors hence the orthogonality condition is not likely to be met for a  fixed-effects 
estimator to produce consistent estimates. Here, an IV estimator that accounts for 
correlated fixed effects and endogenous regressors is more appropriate (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). 
                                                 
4 See Asiedu (2004a) for a review of the literature on the labor marker effects of FDI in Africa. 
5 See Taylor (2000) for a review of the literature on the effect of investment and trade policies on FDI. 
3   We use data for 33 African countries over the period 1984-2003 to examine the 
effect of the liberalization of trade and investment policies on FDI and multinational 
employment. In analyzing the effect of liberalization on investment, we use two measures 
– data on FDI flows from the World Bank and changes in the assets of affiliates of U.S. 
multinational corporations in host countries. In determining the impact of liberalization 
on multinational employment, we use data on employment of affiliates of U.S. MNCs in 
Africa.
6 We find that liberalization has a significant and positive effect on investment. 
However, liberalization does not have a direct impact on multinational employment – the 
effect is indirect: liberalization stimulates multinational investments which in turn 
increases multinational employment. 
  There are three reasons for focusing on Africa. First, many African countries have 
liberalized their investment framework. Using the elimination of controls on capital 
accounts as a measure of liberalization, Asiedu and Lien (2003) find that liberalization 
was more widespread in SSA than in other regions: from 1980-89 to 1990-99, the number 
of countries that had open capital account regimes in SSA increased by about 350%. This 
compares with an increase of 33% for Latin America and a decrease of 33% for East 
Asia.
7 Another reason for focusing on Africa is that the impact of liberalization on FDI 
varies by region (Asiedu and Lien, 2003; Asiedu and Gyimah-Brempong, 2005). 
Furthermore, FDI in Africa is concentrated in natural resources and many have argued 
that resource-seeking investments are less sensitive to policies and conditions prevailing 
in host countries. The third reason for focusing on Africa is that because of the relatively 
small GDPs and low incomes, FDI may be more important for poverty alleviation in SSA 
than in other regions. 
  This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it addresses some of 
the limitations of previous studies. Specifically, the measures of FDI policy that we 
employ can be directly altered by policymakers. Our main policy variable is a composite 
measure that reflects the investment climate in host countries. This FDI policy variable 
                                                 
6 There are two reasons for using U.S. data. First, data on investment and employment of foreign affiliates of MNCs in 
Africa are not readily available except for the affiliates of U.S. MNCs. U.S. MNCs are required by law to provide 
detailed the activities of all their affiliates in foreign countries, hence the data they provide are of sufficient quantity 
and quality to be used for statistical analysis. Second, the U.S. is the largest source country of FDI to Africa, 
accounting for over 20% of FDI to the region (UNCTAD, 2002). 
7 Many countries in East Asia imposed capital controls in the 1990s when they experienced the financial crisis. 
 
4 has four components: risk to operations, taxation, repatriation of profits, and labor costs. 
As a robustness check, we also run regressions using three alternative indices of openness 
that measure restrictions on capital account transactions, restrictions on trade and 
investment, and restrictions on the repatriation of profits. Our analysis also addresses the 
endogeneity and omitted bias problems – we employ a dynamic panel General Method of 
Moments estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for our estimations.  Another 
contribution of the paper is that we examine the effect of liberalization on both FDI and 
multinational employment. This contrasts with previous studies that examine the effect of 
liberalization on either FDI or multinational employment. Finally, our analysis has 
important policy implications in that it permits us to evaluate the effectiveness of 
investment liberalization. For example, if liberalization is not having the desired effect, 
then policymakers may need to re-evaluate their strategies. This is particularly important 
since investments and employment by multinationals play a crucial role in poverty 
reduction in Africa. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 presents the estimated 
equation and discusses the estimation method, Section 3 specifies the hypothesis and also 
describes the data, Section 4 presents the statistical results and Section 5 presents the 
conclusion and policy recommendations. 
 
2  Model and Estimation Method 
2.1 Estimation  Method 
  In this section, we summarize the empirical equations we estimate and describe our 
estimation method. We are concerned with the effects of FDI policies on multinational 
investments as well as employment.  We therefore estimate two equations: 
   it it it FDI FDI POLICY + +e α α 01 β = + X  (1) 
 
   it FDI POLICY it it E ++ α α 23 =+ γ Q ε  (2) 
where   is a measure of FDI in country i in year t,   is the number of employees 
of affiliates of U.S. MNCs in country i  in year t,  X and Q are a vector of control 
it FDI it E
5 variables,   and  it e it ε  are stochastic error terms, and α, β and γ are coefficients to be 
estimated. 
  In panel estimation, neither the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator nor 
Fixed Effect (FE) estimator produces consistent estimates in the presence of dynamics 
and endogenous regressors. The investment and employment equations that we estimate 
have lagged endogenous regressors as well as unobserved country fixed effects which are 
correlated with the regressors hence the orthogonality condition is not likely to be met for 
a GLS or FE estimator to produce consistent estimates.   An IV estimator that accounts 
for correlated fixed effects and endogenous regressors is therefore needed. 
  Arellano and Bond (1991) have proposed a dynamic panel General Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator that produces consistent estimates in the presence of 
dynamics and endogenous regressors. We use the dynamic panel (DPD) estimator partly 
because we do not have reasonable instruments for the endogenous regressors that can be 
excluded from the equations and partly because it produces consistent estimates in the 
presence of endogenous regressors. Arellano and Bond provide a family of dynamic 
panel GMM estimators in the DPD98 program that allows for one to estimate coefficients 
from levels, first difference, or orthogonal deviation of the variables.
8 In this study, we 
estimate the equations in first difference form. 
  The DPD estimator is given as: 
   () =
∧
θ ′ ′′ –1
NN X Z AZ X X AZ y ′   (3) 
where 
∧
θ is a vector of coefficient estimates on both exogenous and endogenous 
regressors,  X and y are the vectors of first differenced regressors and dependent 
variables respectively, Z is a vector of instruments and   is a vector used to weight the 
instruments.  The estimator uses all lagged values of endogenous and predetermined 
variables as well as current and lagged values of exogenous regressors as instruments in 
N A
                                                 
8 Orthogonal deviations express each observation as the deviation from the average of future observations in the sample 
for the same country, and weight these each deviation to standardize the variance.  Formally, the orthogonal deviation 
of the variable ) it x x
∗ ( is given as:  











 for t1 ,, T1 . = − K  Arellano 
and Bond show that if the original errors are uncorrelated and homoskedastic, the transformed errors will also be 
uncorrelated and homoskedastic. 
6 the differenced equation.  For example, for the equation:   323 iii yyx3 i α β Δ =Δ +Δ + Δ ς we 
use   1, i y 1 i x  and  2 i x  as instruments.  For the  4 i y Δ equation,   and  121 ,, , iiii yyxx 2 3 i x serve 
as valid instruments. Instruments for other cross-sectional equations are constructed 
similarly.  These instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, but not 
correlated with the error terms; hence they are “good” instruments. The dynamic panel 
estimator is a GMM IV equivalent of an efficient Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) 
estimator. 
  Arellano and Bond proposed two estimators – one and two-step estimators – with 
the two-step estimator being the optimal estimator.  The one-step estimator uses the 
weighting matrix given by  1 ) –
ii i N A=N ZH Z 1 − ′ ( ∑  where H is T – 2 square matrix with 
2s in the main diagonal, -1s in the first sub diagonal, and 0s everywhere else.   The 
optimal two-step estimator uses an estimated variance-covariance matrix formed from the 
residuals of a preliminary consistent estimate of 
∧
θ  to weight the instruments.  The 
optimal choice of   is:   N A
1 ˆ –
ii ii i NN A =V =N Z Z vv
∧∧ − − ′ ∑   where  is the residual 
obtained from a preliminary consistent estimate of 
i v
∧
θ. We use the two step estimator to 
estimate the coefficients of the growth equation because it is more efficient than the one-
step estimator. However, as suggested by Arellano and Bond and now the standard 
practice, all our hypothesis tests will be based on the one-step estimates. 
  In estimating the equations, we lag all variables by one period to ensure that   
can be treated as exogenous in period t. We make two identifying assumptions of no auto 
correlated errors and that the endogenous regressors are not considered predetermined for 
 but are considered so for    This allows us to use all values of  
1 t– y
, i¸t v 2. i¸t+ v t x  up to  1 t– x  as 
valid instruments for  . t x
∧
  The linear moment restriction implied by the model is 
for    where 1 [( ) ]= 0 it i,t– j i,t– Ey X X ′ Δ− Δ Θ % % 2,..., 1, j= t– 1 (, t– ) X =y X ′ is the vector of 
lagged endogenous and strictly exogenous regressors.  The consistency of the estimates 
hinges on the assumption of lack of auto correlated error terms; hence we test for the 
absence of serial correlation of the error terms.  First differencing of the variables 
naturally generates first order autocorrelation; hence we test for second order 
7 autocorrelation in the error terms.   We also perform Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions which is a joint test of model specification and appropriateness of the 
instrument vector.  If all regressors are strictly exogenous, the DPD, RE, and FE 
estimators are consistent, but only the latter two estimators are efficient.  On the other 
hand, if there are endogenous regressors, the FE and RE estimators are inconsistent.  We 
therefore use a Hausman test to test for the strict exogeneity of all regressors, hence the 
appropriateness of the DPD estimator used to estimate the model. 
 
3 Hypothesis  and  Data Description 
3.1 Hypothesis 
  The impact of liberalization on multinational investment and employment depends 
on the type of investment and the kind of linkages foreign investment has with the 
domestic economy. For efficiency seeking FDI, where FDI is driven by cost 
considerations, investment and trade liberalization may reduce the costs of operating a 
business in the host country and therefore lead to an increase in FDI flows. Assuming that 
capital and labor are complementary inputs, one would expect an increase in capital 
inputs to lead to an increase in labor input, hence employment. When the motivation for 
FDI is tariff-jumping to serve large protected markets, liberalization policies, such as a 
reduction in tariffs, may lead to increased or decreased investments and employment.    
The reason is that instead of producing within the country, firms may import their inputs 
or final products. As a consequence, the theoretical impact of liberalization on FDI and 
employment is unclear; liberalization may lead to increased investment and employment, 
it may lead to the opposite results, or it may not have any employment effects at all.  We 
however note that due to the small sizes of African countries, the tariff jumping motive to 
serve domestic markets is less likely to be relevant.
9 We therefore hypothesize that 
liberalization enhances the investment climate in host countries, and therefore should be 
positively related to multinational investment and employment.  In the case of resource 
extraction FDI, employment is likely to depend on the linkages between foreign 
                                                 
9 The countries in SSA are small, in terms of population and income. For example, 15 out of the 48 
countries in SSA have a population of less than two million and about half of the countries have a 
population of less than six million. With regards to income, about half of the countries have a GDP of less 
than $3 billion. 
8 producers and the host economy (e.g. whether processing of natural resources by the 
multinational company takes place in the host economy) and to what extent the foreign 
company directly employs domestic workers.  For natural resource extracting FDI with 




  In estimating the FDI equation, we employ two measures of FDI. The first is ratio 
of net FDI inflow to GDP, FDI/GDP, obtained from World Bank's World Development 
Indicators, 2005. The second measure is the annual changes in the net assets of U.S. 
affiliates, USFDI. This measure captures the inflows by new firms entering the country as 
well as the expansion of capacity by existing affiliates in a country.
10 For the 
employment equation, we use two measures: the employment by U.S. affiliates as a ratio 
of a country's labor force and the changes in the number of employees of U.S. affiliates in 
host countries. The data for employment and assets are from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, and is available at www.bea.gov. 
FDI Policy 
  Our key measure of liberalization policy, FDI POLICY, captures the host country’s 
attitude toward inward investment and is determined by four components: risk to 
operations, taxation, repatriation of profits, and labor costs. The rating ranges from 0-12, 




  The control variables for the FDI equation are the determinants of FDI suggested by 
the literature. Specifically, we include, corruption and the effectiveness of the rule of law 
as a measure of the host country’s institutions, GDP per capita to measure the 
                                                 
10 Most of the papers in this area use FDI/GDP as a measure of FDI flows. A few exceptions include Taylor 
(2000) who uses the same variable as our second measure of FDI, i.e., the changes in the dollar value of the 
assets of US affiliates. One advantage of using U.S. data is that it is from the same source and therefore the 
data are consistent. The data from the World Bank are reported by individual countries to the Bank and 
there are differences across country about what constitutes an FDI inflow. 
11 See http://www.prsgroup.com/ for more information about the data. 
 
9 attractiveness of the domestic market, the number of telephones per 1000 population as a 
measure of infrastructure development and the share of minerals and oil in total exports 
as a measure of natural resource availability. The data on corruption and rule of law are 
from Political Risk Services and the remaining data are from the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators, 2005. 
  For the employment equation, we included net income of U.S. affiliates as a 
measure of profits and the wages paid by affiliates in host countries as control variables. 
We calculated the wage rate as the total employee compensation of U.S. affiliates in a 
country divided by the number of such employees in a given year. This is a very crude 
measure of wages since the compensation include the compensation of expatriates 
employed by the American affiliate in the host country. The data are from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce, and is available at www.bea.gov. As 
expected, profits should be positively related to employment and wages should have the 
opposite effect. 
  The data are from 1984 to 2003 and are for a sample of 33 African countries over 
the sample period.
12  Not all countries had complete data for all years.  Merging the data 
gave us a sample of 564 usable observations. Summary statistics of the data are provided 
in Table 1.  From the summary statistics, it is clear that while the average number and 
size of U.S. affiliated MNCs across the world is relative; there is a wide cross-country 
variation in the data.  Of particular interest is the variance in the number of affiliates, 
asset size, sales, employee compensation, and also the size of host country.  The large 
variation in the size of host countries suggests the need to account for this size 
differential. 
 
4 Statistical  Results 
  We used the DPD estimator to estimate the two equations. Table 2 presents the 
results for the FDI equation and Table 3 reports the results for the employment equation. 
                                                 
12 The countries in the sample are: Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
10 4.1 Liberalization  and  FDI 
  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 report the results using the share of FDI in GDP, 
FDI/GDP, as dependent variable and Columns (3) and (4) present estimates using 
changes in the assets of foreign affiliates of US MNCs, USFDI,  as dependent variable.  
Also, for each dependent variable, we report the results with and without the measure of 
natural resource availability, NatResource, defined as the share of oil and minerals in 
total exports. 
  The results indicate that overall, the FDI equation fits the data reasonably well. In 
all specifications, there is no evidence of second order serial correlation in the error terms 
of the differenced equation. Furthermore, the Sargan statistics suggest that the equation is 
correctly specified and the instrument vector is appropriate for the equation. Finally, the 
Hausman m statistics lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis that all regressors can be 
treated as strictly exogenous. This suggests that the DPD estimator is the appropriate     
estimator for the FDI equation. 
  As shown in Table 2, the estimated coefficient of our proxy for liberalization 
policies, FDI POLICY, is positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level or 
better, for all the specifications, suggesting that all else equal, FDI liberalization is 
significantly and positively related to FDI inflows to African countries. We performed a 
robustness check by using three alternative measures of liberalization. We used measures 
that capture the ability to trade freely, the ability to freely repatriate profits and the ease 
of capital mobility.  The results confirmed our previous findings:  that liberalization 
stimulates FDI. 
  With regards to the control variables, we note that the coefficients of  and 
are positive and significantly different from zero suggesting that current FDI 
flows are positively influenced by FDI inflows in previous years. Also note that the 
estimated coefficient of the natural resource variable, NatResource, is positive and 
significant: all else equal, a 1% increase in the share of fuel and minerals in exports raises 
U.S. FDI by about 47.3% (Column 4). Thus, omitting the lag dependent variable and/or a 
measure of natural resource from regressions for the FDI equation, as in previous studies, 
leads to an omitted variable bias. Another noticeable point is that the estimated 
1 USFDIt–
1 FDI/GDPt–
11 coefficients of the rule of law variable are positive and significant at the 1% levels in all 
the specification, suggesting that countries in which contracts are enforceable will receive 
more FDI. Also, the estimated coefficients of the corruption variable are positive and 
significant, implying that corruption promotes investments in SSA. This result, although 
counter intuitive, is not surprising because investments in Africa are concentrated in 
natural resources and the countries in the region that are rich in natural resources also 
rank high on the measures of corruption (e.g. Angola and Nigeria). 
  In sum, we find strong evidence that liberalization of investment policies is 
positively associated with FDI flows to Africa.  Our result contrasts with that of Asiedu 
and Lien (2003) who conclude that liberalization had no effect on FDI flows to the 
region. A plausible explanation for the conflicting result is that the estimations of Asiedu 
and Lien (2003) suffer from endogeneity and omitted variable bias. Specifically, they 
employ a fixed-effects estimator and do not include the lag dependent variable in their 
regressions. As discussed earlier, these problems can lead to misleading results. 
 
4.2 Liberalization  and  Employment 
  The coefficient estimates of the employment equation are presented in Table 3. 
Columns 1 and 2 present the estimates of the equation with US affiliates 
employment/total labor force ratio as the dependent variable. We note that this ratio could 
increase without an increase in the employment by affiliates of MNCs in the host 
country. Thus as a robustness check, we also present the estimates of the equation that 
uses total multinational employment in columns 3 and 4.  We reject the null hypothesis 
that all slope coefficients are jointly equal to zero at any reasonable confidence level and 
there is no evidence of second order serial correlation in the error terms.  The Sargan 
statistics indicate that the equation is well specified with appropriate instrument vector 
and the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that all regressors are exogenous. This 
suggests that the DPD estimator is the appropriate estimator for this equation. 
  The estimated coefficients of FDI POLICY are insignificant in all the 
specifications. Also, the estimated coefficients of the lag FDI are positive and 
significantly different from zero at α =.05. This suggests that liberalization does not have 
a direct impact on multinational employment and that the effect is indirect:  liberalization 
12 stimulates multinational investments which in turn increases multinational employment. 
With regards to the control variables, the estimated coefficients are all significant at least 
at α =.05 and they all have the predicted signs. Specifically, lag employment and net 
income have a positive effect on multinational employment and wages has the opposite 
effect.
13 Our results indicate that while liberalization policies may not directly increase 
employment, they do so indirectly through increased employment by multinational 
corporations that take advantage of the liberalized investment environment these policies 
create.  To the extent that liberalization policies lead to increased employment by 
multinational corporations, these policies may contribute to poverty reduction in Africa.  
Our results are consistent with the Nissanke-Thorbecke model (2005) of the mechanisms 
through which globalization can affect poverty and income distribution; in this case, the 
transmission mechanism is employment creation by multinational corporations.  
 
5 Conclusion 
  This paper uses a dynamic panel estimator to examine the impact of the 
liberalization of FDI polices on investment and employment by multinational 
corporations (MNCs) in Africa. There are two major findings. First, liberalization has a 
significant and positive effect on FDI. Second, liberalization does not have a direct 
impact on multinational employment – the effect is indirect: liberalization stimulates 
multinational investments which in turn increases multinational employment. To the 
extent that FDI is crucial for poverty reduction in Africa (as suggested in the United 
Nations Millennium Declaration and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) agreement), countries in the region face at least two challenges. First, they 
have to attract more FDI. In addition, they have to ensure that the FDI that comes into the 
country will alleviate poverty.
14 Our empirical results suggest that policymakers can 
make their countries attractive for FDI by liberalizing their investment regulatory 
                                                 
13 As a robustness check, we included illiteracy rate, Natural Resources, government stability, and conflict 
(one at a time) respectively, as additional regressors to see if this will qualitatively affect the coefficient 
estimates of FDI POLICY and FDI/GDP. The addition of any of these variables as additional regressors did 
not qualitatively affect the coefficient estimate of FDI POLICY and FDI/GDP. We do not present these 
estimates because of space considerations.  The results are available upon request. 
14 See Overseas Development Institute (2002) for a discussion about the effect of FDI on poverty reduction 
and income inequality. 
13 framework.
15 Furthermore, such a policy will also result in an (indirect) increase in 
employment. We however note that FDI tends to employ skilled-labor. Thus to ensure 
that some of the benefits of FDI go to the poor, countries may have to implement policies 
that will encourage MNCs to utilize more unskilled labor. For example, countries may 
provide incentives (such as tax breaks) to foreign firms that hire unskilled workers, locate 
in rural areas or invest in the agricultural sector. Such a policy will not only improve the 
welfare of the poor, but will also reduce income inequality in those countries. Another 
advantage of this policy is that it will diversify foreign investments to the region. 
Specifically, multinational investment in Africa is concentrated in the primary sector and 
investments in natural resources tend to generate very little employment and therefore 
have limited effect on poverty reduction. 
  We end by pointing out that our results should be interpreted with caution. First, our 
measure of FDI is based on aggregate investment data. This is problematic because the 
impact of policy depends on the type of FDI – FDI in natural resources tends to be less 
sensitive to policy changes than FDI in manufacturing and services. Thus, a better 
approach is to disaggregate the FDI data and carry out a sectoral analysis. Unfortunately, 
such data are not readily available for countries in Africa. Second, our analysis focuses 
on employment by affiliates of U.S. MNCs in Africa. It is possible that the results may 
not hold for MNCs from other countries. Finally, the study does not examine the long run 
and short run effects of policy changes. As Milner and Wright (1998) show, the long run 
effects of liberalization policies could be significantly different from the short term 
effects. Thus, to appreciate the full impact of investment liberalization on the operations 
of MNCs, one needs to conduct a time series analysis. 
                                                 
15 We note, however, that liberalization may sometimes not lead to increased FDI flows – e.g., if the host 
country has weak institutions. See Asiedu (2004b), Nunnenkamp (2004) and Asiedu (2006) for a detailed 
discussion. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Sample Data 
Variable Mean*  Std.  Error Minimum  Maximum 
affiliates  14.869 24.338  1.0  262.0 
assets  234.303 400.409  2.0  6011.0 
sales  213.213 242.524  1.5  1569.0 
netincome  49.888 150.595  -292.0  985.0 
employees  35.534 92.852  0.0  884.0 
employee comp.  3.469 9.243  0.0  115.6 
FDI POLICY  4.829  0.899  2.3  6.90 
FDI/GDP  2.189 7.5997  -7.115  101.849 
gdpcap  807.357 973.664  84.736  5237.433 
gdp  1.15E+10 2.17E+10  1.16E+8  1.47E+11 
growth rate  0.352 6.267 -26.271  66.551 
labor force  7572090 8174275  152924  4.78E+7 
corrupt  2.651 1.071  0.0  6 
govtstab  6.528 2.492  0.0  11.583 
lawandordwer  2.729 1.251  0.0  6 
tel  11.966 17.588  0.3  97.70 
NatResource  35.867 33.121  0.025  99.101 
N 650       




Columns 1 and 2 report regressions using FDI/GDP as dependent variable and Columns 3 and 4 report the 


















        




















        




        




        

















        








        










        





2 x   382.76 [7]  633.29 [8]  786.53 [7]  521.67 [8] 
1
st ord. autocor.  -1.56  -1.19  -1.37  -1.09 
2
nd ord. autocor.  0.47  0.52  0.38  -0.89 
Hausman m  118.72 [7]  98.65 [8]  123.42 [7]  67.43 [8] 
Sargan  12.32 [63]  15.87 [62]  13.09 [34]  9.74 [68] 
+ Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. *** significant at α = .01 
** significant at α = .05 * significant at α = .10 
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Table 3 


















        








        








        














        




        








        
Wald 
2 x   182.46 [5]  79.54 [5]  143.07 [5]  175.26 [5] 
1
st ord. autocor.  -2.65  -2.28  -2.15  -3.15 
2
nd ord. autocor.  -0.33  -0.76  0.86  -0.48 
Hausman m  24.46 [5]  55.13 [5]  61.32 [5]  31.66 [5] 
Sargan  12.58 [12]  15.44 [12]  16.46 [18]  23.28 [14] 
+ Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. *** significant at α = .01 
** significant at α = .05 * significant at α = .10 
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